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ABSTRACT
This article analyses some less explored structural parts of the phenomenological method 
as it was construed by Husserl in order to validate a twofold thesis. First, the application of 
phenomenological notions such as the neutrality modification, the distinction between the 
positional, transcendental, and imaginative ego, body-consciousness, etc. stimulates the 
deconstruction of a “spiritual” quest in any traditional and/or modern sense. On the other 
hand, this approach offers some new possibilities for the quest for “transcendental absolu-
tion” which is illustrated here by Valéry’s creative approach. Husserl’s and Valéry’s distinct 
but complementary projects represent several major intellectual shifts in early contempo-
rary Western philosophy and literature.
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RESUMO
Este artigo analisa algumas partes estruturais menos exploradas do método fenomenoló-
gico tal como compreendido por Husserl, a fim de validar uma tese bipartida. Primeiro, a 
aplicação de noções fenomenológicas, como ‘modificação de neutralidade’, a distinção 
entre ego posicional, transcendental e ego imaginativo, a consciência corporal, etc., esti-
mula a desconstrução de uma busca “espiritual” em qualquer sentido tradicional e/ou mo-
derno. Por outro lado, esta abordagem oferece algumas novas possibilidades para a busca 
de “absolvição transcendental” que é ilustrada aqui pela abordagem criativa de Valéry. 
Os projetos distintos, porém, complementares de Valéry e Husserl representam muitas das 
principais mudanças intelectuais na filosofia e literatura ocidental contemporânea.
Palavras-chave: Edmund Husserl, Paul Valéry, fenomenologia, consciência, dor.
On the “Idol of the Mind”: 
Edmund Husserl and Paul Valéry
Sobre o “Ídolo da Mente”: 
Edmund Husserl e Paul Valéry
Mindaugas Briedis1
I confess that I have made of my mind an idol, but I have found no other 
(Valéry, 1948, p. 40).
Introduction
It is well known that several turns taken by philosophers in the West at the end of 19th 
century (“the age of progress”) prepared the methodological grounds for a radically new 
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approach to traditional anthropological problems that trans-
formed the humanities (see Spiegelberg, 1982). Yet because 
of the extrapolation to myriad fields of human theory and 
praxis, the potential of this particular intellectual revolution 
remains promising.
When Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) dedicated him-
self to the radical renovation of philosophy as a strict sci-
ence dedicated to the demarcation of essential structures 
of experience (Wissenschaft) and called this phenomenology, 
it was still hard to tell how this fundamental investigation 
of the logos of phainomena of any kind would be received in 
such diverse areas of human research as psychotherapy, lit-
eral studies, structuralism, visual arts, or cognitive sciences 
(see Husserl, 2001). On the other hand, the era had already 
been shaped by the works of F. Nietzsche, S. Kierkegaard, 
M. Proust, J. Joyce, and legions of symbolists, impression-
ists, and/or surrealists who one after another offered revo-
lutionary insights concerning the human condition and the 
methodology relevant to its investigation. Husserl became a 
champion of the whole  ectrum of new theoretical para-
digms while other proponents of this turbulent intellectual 
era received much less attention. Hence, besides the father 
of phenomenology, we wish to bring one more man of great 
academic spirit into discussion, who quite early on made an 
attempt to conjoin intellectual purity with a spiritual quest 
while at the same time opposing any kind of We ern rela-
tivism as well as the dogmatic “spiritual” bables of bourgeois 
society. This is the French poet Paul Valery.
Husserlian Typology of the 
Ego and Deconstruction of 
“Spiritual” Matters2
The Self could never manage to function if it did 
not believe … it was all (Valéry, 1948, p. 23).
Though Husserl did not write much on religion ex-
cept when talking about Fichte (see Waibel et al., 2010), it is 
well known that the relation between phenomenology and 
tradition of religious thinking was determined as a heavy 
critique of the latter by Heidegger via his conception of 
onto-theology (see Thompson, 2000). On the other hand, 
Husserl’s approach is relevant to a much wider horizon of 
“spiritual” matters than traditional religions represent, be-
cause of the distinctive phenomenological typology of the 
ego envisioned in his theory of Imagination, i.e. the impor-
tance of imaginative variation and neutrality modification for 
the whole enterprise of phenomenology (see Husserl, 2005).
One thing that Husserl’s reductions presuppose is that 
the basic problem of philosophy in particular and human-
ities in general is a narrowing down of every phenomena to 
their “real” or “ideal” ontological values, as is the case of pos-
iting, natural sciences. This is the reason why science and/
or philosophy escape essential structures of intuition and 
givenness, because they have been metaphysically focused 
on objects and not the structural ways in which objects are 
given (see Crowell, 2006). This relation of the ego to its en-
vironment (in the broadest sense) Husserl called the natural 
or naive attitude (see Husserl, 2006). Nevertheless, Husserl 
constantly introduced new concepts in order to clarify this 
original idea of his phenomenology, one of which is crucial 
for our thesis here. 
In manuscripts dedicated to the project of Imagination 
(consisting of Image-consciousness and Phantasie) Husserl con-
stantly relies on the concept of positionality (Positionalität), 
which denotes the positioning of things according to actual, 
real, factual relations to particular subject-matter. This in 
turn presupposes a positional subject – the entity that is cru-
cial for a consideration of any “spiritual” quests. The positional 
ego demarcates a real, actual or, as it were, psychological agent 
involved in coping with things according to particular be-
liefs – first of all, belief in the actual existence of those things. 
It appears that the question of how to reduce or “disconnect” 
positionallity interests Husserl because of the methodological 
foundations of phenomenology itself, while every spiritual 
argumentation concentrates on this very personal concern, 
presupposing the positional ego.
If Husserl, following Kant, sees consciousness as an 
all-embracing synthesis, he must have finally found it (Fund-
ierung) in some kind of basic intermediate intentional acts. 
In other words, for any experience to be possible there must 
be (besides the celebrated Time-consciousness, structured 
by protentions, impressional moments, and retentions) some 
kind of a ivity modifying the attitude via some intentional act 
responsible for this kind of modification into a non-positional 
mode. Husserl calls this part of the whole structure of reduc-
tion neutralization, as the fundamental modification (Neutral-
ität Modifikation) of the positional ego, which in turn belongs 
to the domain of Imagination.
The  ecificity of the modification performed by imag-
ination, or, more precisely, Phantasie, differs drastically from 
the positionality that pertains to perception.3 The dialecti-
cal relation between the presentation of sensual data by per-
ception and the playful co-presentation or presentification 
2 Understanding the method of transcendental reduction always oscillated between it being taken as “friendly” to mystical thought 
and rather strictly oppositional to this approach, for example, in Mohanty, who saw it as a strict scientific method (see in this regard, 
Mohanty, 1991).
3 For example, in the case of image apprehension the structure of image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) is at work, which with its 
physical media (pictures, paintings, etc.) remains rooted (founded) in perception but differently from way in which the latter (Phantasie) 
exhibits the structure of twofold apprehension (when the appearing image and the “subject” of the image do not coincide). On the 
other hand, Phantasie is not rooted in any physical substrate of a particular medium.
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(something given “as if ” (Gleich) it were given by perception) 
of the initially modified content of perception by means of 
Phantasie is one of the cornerstones of Husserl’s overall ap-
proach. Positional acts, or as Husserl sometimes puts it, dox-
ic acts (see Cairns, 2013), are those that are experientially 
based in reality and actuality, which is a distinct feature of 
the structure of perception. Thus, for example, the doxic 
act of hesitating as rooted in “real” circumstances structural-
ly presupposes the anticipation of real consequences of this 
particular, actual situation. This is basically how we sur-
vive; thus it is “natural” but at the same time unreflective, 
and eventually “naïve.” But besides these “natural” impulses 
we are equipped with the power to imagine and eventually 
vary or play with those natural doxic acts, for example while 
imagining making a judgment or hesitating to do so. Most 
importantly, that structure of imagination which isn’t root-
ed in a physical substrate (images), i.e. Phantasie, appears as 
a free variation that starts from neutrality modification in its 
constitution of the horizon of free and playful possibilities. 
Hence, while perception introduces an object to us (or vice 
versa) as concrete, actual, and real, Phantasie plays with this 
encounter in all possible ways of positing.
In this “passion play” of Phantasie the importance or even 
the very difference between the existence or non-existence 
of some thing doesn’t matter anymore in that sense that “ob-
jects” of imagination do not present themselves as “lacking ex-
istence”, but as having another synthetic value performed by 
consciousness, maybe the greatest value. On the other hand, 
imagination essentially founds every apprehension, because 
synthetic appresentation delivers different sides of the same ob-
jects at hand while we experience only the one that is given 
directly (perceptually). Hence it is only possible to experience 
the whole richness of any “object” via this “irreality” (Irreelle) 
structured by Phantasie.4
For our further discussion it is very important that not 
only the discrete “objects” but the whole horizon of the irreal 
becomes accessible through this imaginative neutrality mod-
ification. On the other hand, though the modified horizon 
of the imagination flows as a free play, it is not chaotic: the 
validity or invalidity of judgments and space and time con-
figurations are still operating here (see Husserl, 1909). Third, 
neutrality modification influences and in a sense initiates 
the imagining ego, i.e. the transition or, as Husserl puts it, dis-
placement of the self or initially naïve agent.5 Because of the 
fact that imagined objects are non-present (presentyfied), the 
“affection of reality” (a term used widely in phenomenolog-
ical psychology) shifts elsewhere – the very act of givenness 
becomes a new reality and its affection is of a different kind 
because it is sheer possibility rather than actuality. Phantasie 
tears us apart from the real while at the same time opening a 
space for being (thinking) “otherwise.” This brake with the fa-
miliarity of a natural attitude brings the imagining ego one step 
closer to the transcendental ego.6 It is just the ontic modality of 
a particular object that is neutralized, but this “just” is a cru-
cial step towards the celebrated transcendental reduction by 
which we su end not only beliefs in physically “real” objects 
but also concerns about psychologically ”ultimate” spiritual 
urges (Tillich, 1952).
In this context of freedom from the real and actual, the 
ego stands as the biggest problem. Though this sounds very 
relevant to Eastern spirituality, for phenomenology it is one of 
the challenges that has to be embraced, i.e. is the ego “lost” in 
a free play of imaginative variations? (Sartre, 1957). As stated 
above, all positional a ects or everyday coping-with-things 
performed by the ego are neutralized in a process of brack-
eting belief between reality and actuality, but now it is neces-
sary to stress that this changes something in its very structure. 
Hence, the imaginative ego becomes a non-positional tran-
scendental ego in the sense that the neutrality now consists 
not in belief (which is also at hand for scholars of eidetic sci-
ences) but in the experience of imagined objects as unreal, i.e. 
free as much as they are possible. 
Paradoxically enough, e ecially after all the accusations 
made by existentially minded critiques arguing that Husserl’s 
Transcendental ego is anemic, lifeless, and incomprehensible, 
it appears that on the contrary, non-positionality (enabled 
by neutrality modification) brings the ego closer to “her” ob-
jects precisely because “she” is disintere ed and dispassionate, 
which in turn constitutes “her” in the strict opposition to psy-
chological positionality or natural naivety, resting on every 
kind of metaphysical postulate.7 Now it is time to see how 
this newly constituted ego, who is not bound to any particu-
lar context of “natural” circumstances, who has the power to 
make any context an “object” of free variation, finds herself 
in the quest of moving away from the individual and the sin-
gular to the essences of experience. In the second part of the 
article we will follow one such project initiated by the French 
poet Valéry (1871-1945). At the same time it will enable us 
to put neutrality modification into a wholly new context and 
challenge its limits.
4 It is worth noticing in this regard the importance of imagination for the distinctively Western spiritual exercises designed by the Roman 
Stoics: “Unlike the Buddhist meditation practices of the Far East, Greco-Roman philosophical meditation is not linked to a corporeal 
attitude but is a purely rational, imaginative, or intuitive exercise that can take varied forms” (Hadot, 1995, p. 59). On the other hand, 
this brings phenomenology closer to Stoic ethics (see in this regard, Madison, 2009).
5 Concerning the phenomenological notion of Displacement in Husserl, see Sokolowski (2000).
6 It is important to note that the imagining ego performing neutrality modification and free variation is a necessary but not yet sufficient 
condition for transcendental reduction; otherwise such thinkers as Proust would be called phenomenologists, though they have a sub-
jectivist approach. What else do we need in order to reach the transcendental?
7 Paradoxically enough, at the beginning of the twentieth century Husserl’s ideas influenced the “existential theists” represented by 
P. Tillich, G. Marcel, R. Bultmann, and others.
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Monsieur Teste’s “pain” 
Man is different from me, from you. That which 
thinks is never that which it thinks about, 
and since the first is a form with a voice, the second 
takes all forms and all voices. So, no one is man, 
M. Teste least of all (Valéry, 1948, p. 63).
If we wished to oppose philosophy and poetry, we 
could say in phenomenological fashion that the beauty of 
conscious “performances” or pure delight of the mind and its 
accomplishments always transcend any aesthetic creation 
and thus cannot be captured entirely by the creative mode 
performed by the artists. Perhaps this is why Valéry saw the 
importance of relating a poetic attitude to the phenom-
enological approach in the quest to uncover the relation 
between structures of consciousness and human situation. 
Thus all of his conscious life Valéry sought to capture the 
very process of thought-becoming (see Mathews, 1948) and 
developed his own creative approach to the transcenden-
tal realm. Without any metaphysical, social or psycholog-
ical explanations he managed to document those states of 
consciousness that are distinguished by the highest inten-
sity and complete self-referentially. Out of these efforts the 
fictional hero was born, whose name was Monsieur Tes-
te.8 In the introduction to the series of Te e’s “adventures,” 
J. Mathew describes him as a product of a “lifetime of med-
itation on the question: How would a complete mind be-
have as an everyday man?” (Valéry, 1948, p. xii). At the same 
time, this project is carried out in the midst of everyday-
ness: “We see him at the cafe, the theater, at home, even in 
bed; we watch him think, make love, sleep, stroll in the park” 
(Valéry, 1948, p. xii). According to Jean Starobinski, “Te e 
has set out to overcome inner chance, to do away with the 
original automatism, social in origin (‘to kill the puppet’), 
and to create others through voluntary exercise (‘I sought a 
mechanical sieve’)” (Starobinski, 1989, p. 375).
In the face of Te e, Valéry is seeking to withdraw from 
the ordinary self by constantly reflecting and overcoming the 
chaotic intentional life of consciousness. In his Nietzschean 
passion, Te e seeks a “will to attention” while testing its limits, 
for example, willfully connecting to a singular thought for a 
particular period of time or staying in the same mood while 
changing places and physical surroundings. In short, he makes 
a giant effort to equate his being to his own powers of creative 
variation.9 In Husserlian terms Te e seeks kind of evidenced 
life.10 This means that evidence-constitution must be execut-
ed by replacing “alien” thoughts with one’s own, thus gaining 
the distinct epistemological-ontological status of the witness 
(Valéry, 1948, p. 78),11 where the reflexive ego blends with its 
own experiential structures. 
It is striking how Valéry varies in opposing that attitude 
which we called “positionality” in a chapter dedicated to Husserl: 
•  “My dear fellow, you are ‘perfectly uninteresting.’ But 
your skeleton is not, neither is your liver, nor in itself 
your brain—nor your stupid look, nor those retarded 
eyes of yours—and all your ideas. If I could only know 
the mechanics of a fool!” (Valéry, 1948, p. 41).
•  “The mind must not be concerned with persons. De 
personis non curandum” (Valéry, 1948, p. 88).
•  “But isn’t that just what M. Te e is seeking: to with-
draw from the self, the ordinary self, by constantly 
trying to diminish, to combat, to compensate for the 
irregularity, the anisotropy of consciousness” (Valéry, 
1948, p. 88).
Hence Te e trains himself to think constantly, to neu-
tralize, modify, and vary experiences relentlessly, and he holds 
every piece of memory or expectance in the clearest light of 
presence as a directly experienced event: “We find in our-
selves a capacity for modifications (stressed by M.B.) almost as 
varied as circumstances surrounding us” (Starobinski, 1989, 
p. 400). Following St. Augustine and Husserl, Te e takes 
to the extremes the truth that even the sense of the past, 
its image structure is a fact of the present. After a string of 
situations have been exhausted by the reflective powers of 
M. Te e,12 he comes to the final point in his battle for absolu-
tion – reflection on the structure of pain-experience. 
Experience of pain as any other instant of body-conscious-
ness belongs to what is called kinesthetic experience, mentioned 
by Husserl as the peculiar way in which we apprehend (or just 
live out) our own embodiment.13 Body in Valéry’s project is 
8 While being a prominent poet, Valéry is perhaps best known for his series of short stories about this fictional hero and his “thought-ex-
periments.” Another important source is Valéry’s intellectual diary, called the Cahiers (Notebooks). Later on, Valery found poetry unsat-
isfying and irrelevant to his investigation of consciousness, hence he stopped writing verses for several decades: “The one thing superior 
to a perfect poem, he thought, would be a full knowledge of how it was made” (Mathews, 1948, p. vi).
9 Just compare this to Husserl’s maxim “to get back to the things themselves”: “He spoke, and one felt oneself confounded with things 
in his mind: one felt withdrawn, mingled with houses, with the grandeurs of space, with the shuffled colours of the street, with street cor-
ners. […] His mind seemed to transform to its own use all that is, a mind that performed everything suggested to it” (Valéry, 1948, p. 14).
10 Concerning both men, I cannot help noticing how similarly rigorously their daily routine was dedicated to exploring and writing.
11 Husserl sought immediate acquaintance with his own experience and thus to evaluate any kind of phenomena as absolutely evident. 
See on the concept of phenomenological evidence in Levin (1970).
12 Theatre where he masters the crowd, coffee place, etc.
13 In the context of this article it is worth noting that phenomenology was developed mostly in the direction of body-consciousness by 
the followers of Husserl-Sartre, Heidegger, and especially Mearlau-Ponty. This in a way overshadows the contribution to the analysis of 
embodiment made by Husserl himself, for example, as delivered in the 5th meditation and elsewhere.
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arguably the central modality, i.e. it is an instance of incar-
nated dialectics between determination and illumination, in a 
sense echoing Sartre’s dialectic’s of freedom and responsibility, 
or, further still, Hegel’s correlation between master and slave. 
As we have seen, every a ect of experience served for Te e 
as a particular case of the functioning of his mind; thus pain 
and its peculiar kinesthetic nature also becomes that “materi-
al” which must be converted into knowledge.14 But what is the 
structure of this “painful” knowledge?
In reply Valéry delivers a breathtaking description in 
which he combines the power of poetics with phenomeno-
logical scrutiny. After we are introduced to the way in which 
Te e manages to master modes of neutralizing apparently 
independent content of consciousness and to perform a kind 
of eidetic variation step by step, he deconstructs the subject–
object dichotomy. In his own way he shows how the expe-
rience of pain is “stuffed” with retentions and protentions, 
associations, and anticipations; and finally, he marks the de-
marcation area for the ego absolution while at the same time 
constituting conditions for the tran ersonal experience. It is 
precisely the experience of pain that melds together Te e as 
 ectator and Te e as sufferer. This also negates the passivity 
that was traditionally rendered to the “sensual data receiving 
ego.” The transgression and aggression of Te e’s experiments 
(not “the outer world”) means that his project of total dom-
ination meets pain as its reversal. Is Te e an absolute intel-
lectual hero or does this mean the end of an “ecstasy of un-
derstanding everything without being caught in the trap of 
participation” (Starobinski, 1989, p. 375)?
Valéry e ablishes pain as the last stand between Te e 
and absolute domination, where the kinesthetically owned 
body constitutes the battlefield. It is crucial that “danger comes 
to him from himself ” (Starobinski, 1989, p. 376) and the only 
appropriate response can be a careful perceptive attention to 
pain – the “strongest thing in the world” (Notebooks). Despite 
this, Te e (with some limits) creates a consciousness of Pain. 
Kinesthetic themes appearing in the bed-scene reflect the in-
stable life of the mind – such rhetorical figures as “swimming”, 
“floating,” or “sinking” transform the surroundings due to the 
amalgam of supreme attention and free imagination. Under 
this reflective gaze sensation gives Te e more hints as to the 
mystics of pain. First of all, it is interruptive, which means that 
pain brings interruption as the theme of reflection, which it-
self becomes interrupted. Later on he identifies painful expe-
rience as the expectation of terrible “objects” and the visual-
ization of unbearable states. This anticipatory structuring in 
turn implies another transcendental condition of pain, i.e. the 
oscillation of moving away and getting back to the disgusting 
imagery of one in pain. All is summed up when the reflection 
on this oscillation as partial control becomes a challenge for an 
absolute control that is in vain, because reflection does not take 
us to a higher stage but is just modified repetition.
At the culmination of his work, Valery interprets the 
“I can” of phenomenological existentialism as “I fight” (pain), 
when consciousness of one’s own body becomes a limit case: 
“Te e has interpreted to be able to do to mean to fight” (Star-
obinski, 1989, p. 378) when doing and feeling blend together 
in structural proximity. But this limit is a paradox because at 
the same time it is the start, the source from which conscious-
ness originates. Hence when pain is converted into knowledge 
something that mystics called “God” appears. “God is what is 
closest” (Valéry, 1948, p. 80) proclaims Valéry, reminding us 
intimately of our own thoughts in the face of the illumination 
by the transcendental ego, who alone is eternal, immortal, in-
different, pure, disintere ed, etc. Pain illuminates the body, 
which was “a privilege that the mystical tradition attributed to 
the mind” (Starobinski, 1989, p. 384). Body becomes a revela-
tion and testimony but not of transcendence, of the transcen-
dental – when the “geometry” of pain tells the true story of 
the body and consciousness: “at the end of body is conscious-
ness, but at the end of consciousness is body” (Valéry, 1948, 
p. 80). Valéry calls this achievement of transcendental reflec-
tion impersonal consciousness, when pain crosses the dialectics 
between “mine” and “alien” and enters the transcendental realm.
This is just to briefly touch (before another stroke of 
pain) on something that can be known and surely cannot be 
exploited for personal needs (for example, in spiritual quests 
rooted in positional certainties). This means that while tran-
scendental awareness is the biggest achievement of conscious-
ness, at the same time its structure remains pure and hence 
a priori transcendent to psychological, esthetical, or religious 
urges. As Starobinski summarizes, “it is not equivalent, for 
Te e, to a liberation of the person through the exercise of 
consciousness. It is another strange power, contained in the 
self, but ‘distinct’ from it” (Starobinski, 1989, p. 393). On the 
other hand, If the reflection on pain tells us that in essence we 
are too complicated to manage ourselves, there is also a prom-
ise of the absolute and infinite here, in reflecting on the basic 
structures of experience, be it the mathematical precision of 
Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions or the passionate 
freedom of Valéry’s imagination: “it is the unknown that I 
carry in myself that makes me myself ” (Valéry, 1948, p. 43).
Conclusion
In the first part of the article, I presented a phenomeno-
logical critique of “spiritual–religious” thinking, understood in 
the broadest sense under the general denominator of position-
ality. The deconstructive arguments were based on Husserl’s 
distinction between the positional, imaginative, and tran-
scendental egos, which shows that there is a danger of mak-
ing a principal (categorial) mistake while shifting existentially 
charged attention from observation, reflection, and descrip-
14 Another phenomenologically interesting issue concerning pain could be how new phenomena enter the experiential field. But we 
must set this intriguing problem aside for now.
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tion to explanation (metaphysics) and from the transcendental 
to the individual or the psychological (positioning). Hence the 
aspirations presupposed in any spiritual quest are irrelevant to 
the psychological ego because their nature is uncovered after 
the su ension of doxic beliefs by the powers of neutrality mod-
ification and imagination, where objects are transmitted into 
the sphere of possibility rather than actuality, where reflexive 
ego blends with its own experiential structures.
In the second part of the article, I showed that Valéry’s 
literary project in its own way sought to describe such trans-
formation, and thus that it bears a lot of phenomenological 
significance. Valéry’s fictional hero Monsieur Te e seeks to 
think constantly, to neutralize and vary experiences relentless-
ly in order to achieve an absolutely conscious autonomy while 
reflecting on the most ordinary experiences. 
After the whole range of experiential modalities, the 
reflection on pain-experience reduces Te e’s initial detach-
ment from ordinary modes of being. Pain as interruptive at-
tentionality here signifies the general instability of a subjective 
life. Incapable of reducing the body to an object, Te e expe-
riences kinesthetic illumination as the highest mode of knowl-
edge, which is delivered by means of imagination and body 
consciousness and is transformed into impersonal conscious-
ness. Body-consciousness, or kinesthesia in Valery’s approach, 
become a ground and horizon for extreme modifications of 
consciousness, hence pain (and death) becomes a limit to the 
possibility of freedom as free variation while the “idol of the 
mind” finally finds its roots in the transcendental condition-
ing set out by the body-experience.
In the projects of Husserl and Valéry, imagination demar-
cates and structures the world of its master, becoming a ma-
jor tool in her path to transcendental absolution. But this also 
means that We ern loyalty to the standards of rationality fi-
nally disregards any cultural, social, or intersubjectively consti-
tuted Other, thus objectifying it as irrational. Then even imag-
ination, which in principle is able to break with the narrowness 
of doxic givenness, encloses the individual in its own subjectivity.
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